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The assumption underlying much of the debate about nuclear proliferation is that 
future threats proliferation emanate primarily from states outside the democratic 
community. Ben Challis, however, argues that this assumption is mistaken. Instead, he 
points to a number of common characteristics among authoritarian states that hinder 
their ability to pursue nuclear weapons, providing more flexibility and time in which 
the international community can respond. In contrast, many democratic states have the 
capacity to build nuclear weapons quickly and face growing incentives to do so – 
suggesting a reassessment of counter-proliferation efforts is required. 
 
 
Despite the relative availability of the knowledge and materials needed to produce nuclear 
weapons, aspiring proliferators from authoritarian states have struggled to achieve success 
in building them.1 In the course of the past few decades, regimes in Libya, Iran, Iraq, Syria 
and Brazil pursued weapons for a number of years but have ultimately been unable to 
obtain a nuclear arsenal. In North Korea, progress was slow and marred by a catalogue of 
failures.2
 
In contrast, many democratic countries are believed to be capable of producing 
weapons quickly and easily, should they take the political decision to do so.3
 
In reaching 
this position, they have already overcome many of the technical hurdles at which 
authoritarian countries have fallen, most importantly in the production of sufficient 
weapons-usable fissile material.4
 
As the global security environment becomes increasingly 
uncertain, experts say that many states are likely to face growing incentives to pursue 
nuclear weapons.5
 
In this context, some have warned that democratic states may well 
become the main drivers of future proliferation.6
 
Japan is an illustrative example; it 
possesses the capacity to produce nuclear weapons quickly and easily, and, in a 
deteriorating security environment, will face strong incentives to do so.7
 
This asymmetry in 
the ability to proliferate raises important issues regarding the way in which the threat of 
future proliferation will unfold.  
 
It should be noted at the outset that any discussion of ‘authoritarian states’ is a 
generalisation which masks important and substantial differences in the political 
structures present in the countries the category attempts to capture. Juan Linz is just 
one author who has explored these nuances and their consequences in terms of 
approach to governance in greater detail than is permissible here, but which can 
nevertheless be useful for heuristic purposes.8 For the purposes of this article, 
however, an authoritarian state is characterised as one in which the political leadership 
is not accountable to public opinion through more or less transparent institutions, and 
in which a relatively autonomous ruling elite exercises a high degree of control over 
the public activities of other societal actors in order to prevent effective challenges to 
their authority.9  
 
There are characteristics inherent to such countries with authoritarian political systems 
which inhibit their ability to produce nuclear weapons. First, the impact of regime type 
on a country’s international relations makes it significantly more challenging for 
authoritarian states to acquire the equipment and expertise needed to pursue nuclear 
weapons. Secondly, authoritarian states tend to isolate their domestic constituencies 
from international networks, thus impeding the capacity of key actors to work 
effectively. Finally, restrictions on the autonomy of the domestic community, and a 
tendency to use clientelistic recruitment practices, mean these programmes tend to be 
‘dysfunctional’.10 Despite this, the assumption underlying much of the narrative on 
nuclear proliferation is that the threat of future proliferation primarily comes from 
states outside the democratic community.11
 
It may be suggested that the relative 
concern with these states is justified as their possession of nuclear weapons is 
inherently more dangerous;12
 
yet, this argument is unconvincing and any further 
nuclear proliferation is a cause for concern.13
 
However, with the relative risks of 
proliferation and the reasons why states may seek nuclear arsenals having been 
covered extensively elsewhere,14
 
it is instead important to further an understanding of 
the particular challenges faced by authoritarian regimes after the decision to seek 
nuclear weapons. 
 
It is widely understood that a state’s domestic political structure affects the ways in which 
it interacts with the international community. Perhaps the most widely cited example of 
this relationship is the democratic peace theory, which holds that liberal democracies do 
not go to war with one another.15
 
This alone may have implications for authoritarian states 
seeking nuclear weapons. As Michael Doyle observes, the pacification of relations 
between liberal states ‘only seems to work in the liberals’ relations with other liberals’, 
with democracies having on various occasions demonstrated a willingness to use force 
against authoritarian states.16 Such force may be used in an attempt to prevent an aspiring 
proliferator from obtaining nuclear weapons. A prominent example of such ‘counter-
proliferation strikes’ is the Israeli strike on Iraqi production facilities in 1981.17 Such 
strikes, however, cannot be considered a significant obstacle to an authoritarian state that 
seeks to obtain nuclear weapons and do not explain what has become a consistent failure 
on the part of authoritarian countries to produce them. They are both rare and 
ineffectual.18
 
Whilst they may place an additional burden on resources, a determined 
proliferator can succeed even when resources are scarce, as recently demonstrated by 
impoverished North Korea, which is thought to be capable of delivering a miniaturised 
nuclear warhead using domestic launch capacity, according to the commander of US 
Forces Korea, General Curtis Scaparrotti.19 Moreover, these ‘surgical strikes’ may 
actually assist regimes in overcoming many of the challenges which are peculiar to 
authoritarian countries by arousing ‘nationalist fervor’.20  
 
The primary impact of international relations relates instead to the acquisition of the 
equipment and expertise needed to build nuclear weapons. In order to create a weapons 
programme, states must seek sensitive equipment, materials and knowledge, the transfer 
of which is highly regulated by the international community. In some cases, another 
country may make these transfers in order to deliberately aid the recipient in their pursuit 
of nuclear weapons. Proliferation in both Pakistan and Israel occurred as a result of such 
transfers, from China and France respectively.21
 
More commonly, however, states may 
exploit the dual-use nature of nuclear technology by seeking ostensibly civilian nuclear 
assistance while diverting these resources for military uses. Limitations regarding access 
to such technology are enshrined in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), under 
which ‘supplier states’ are responsible for providing such transfers and ensuring that 
resources are not used for weapons programmes.22 
 
This assistance is ‘critical’ for an aspiring proliferator, according to Matthew Kroenig.23 
Indeed, since 1955 no state has even attempted to acquire nuclear weapons ‘without first 
receiving civilian assistance’.24 As Bluth observes, very few recipients of assistance have 
then gone on to pursue nuclear weapons.25
 
Given that the focus in this article is the ability 
of a state to do so, however, the likelihood of receiving such transfers is an important 
consideration. 
 
For a number of reasons authoritarian countries face greater difficulties in obtaining 
nuclear assistance from the international community. This argument is corroborated 
empirically by Matthew Fuhrmann, who shows that the recipients of nuclear assistance in 
the period 1945–2000 were overwhelmingly democratic states.26 It is impossible to 
conclude that they received assistance because they were democracies. Nevertheless, 
causal mechanisms which make it more likely that democracies receive assistance vis-à-
vis authoritarian countries are identifiable. Under the conditions of the NPT, in order to 
provide assistance, the supplier must be confident that the recipient does not intend to 
renege on their promise to forgo nuclear weapons. The fear that others states will break 
prior commitments is ‘predominant’ in the conduct of international relations, but in 
general, democratic states are considered less likely to do so.27
  
 
Indeed, international commitments made by democracies are afforded greater credibility 
for two reasons. First, democratic political culture is thought to embody respect for the 
rule of law which ‘percolates into foreign policy’, likely increasing respect of the country 
in question for international treaties.28 Second, the existence of democratic political 
institutions means that political leaders must be mindful of public opinion when making 
foreign-policy decisions. Reneging on prior international commitments is likely to make 
political leaders appear untrustworthy to domestic audiences. Michael Tomz has 
conducted experimental research demonstrating that this ‘audience cost’ creates strong 
incentives for democratic leaders to honour international agreements.29 Moreover, when 
treaties are representative of public opinion, breaking them would run counter to the logic 
of democratic accountability.30 Given the obligation of suppliers of nuclear assistance to 
ensure that the recipients have no intention of reneging on their commitments under the 
NPT, this means that authoritarian regimes are less likely to receive assistance vis-à-vis 
democratic states.31 
 
In addition, democratic states are far more likely to possess the capacity to provide 
nuclear assistance; indeed, most of the leading suppliers are democracies.32
 
For two 
reasons, this means that authoritarian regimes will find it relatively difficult to acquire 
nuclear assistance – the first of which is that congruence in the security concerns of 
democracies makes it prudent for democratic states to strengthen each other’s positions,33 
against which the existence of non-democratic states is often construed as a threat .34 As 
such, democratic states are less likely to take action which may strengthen the position of 
non-democratic states, including through the provision of nuclear assistance.35 Research 
by Shannon Blanton has confirmed this bias, suggesting that democracies are more likely 
than non-democracies to receive conventional arms transfers from the United States, for 
example.36 This pattern existed even during the Cold War, when the likelihood of a 
strategic alliance with non-democratic states was, arguably, far greater.37  
 
The second reason why authoritarian states will find it relatively difficult to acquire 
assistance in developing a nuclear capability is that such assistance is ‘routinely’ used  by 
states as a means to improve bilateral relations.38
 
This was, for instance, a key motivation 
behind Canadian assistance to India, which was ultimately essential in facilitating that 
country’s weapons programme.39 States are more likely to pursue positive relations with 
those they consider to be a part of their ‘international in-group’ and domestic political 
structure is a key determinant of this group’s membership.40 Consequently, while 
democracies continue to dominate the means to supply nuclear assistance, non-
democracies will face disadvantages in obtaining it. A note of caution is needed, however: 
just as democracies are likely to support each other, non-democracies have an incentive to 
strengthen other non-democratic states. Indeed, studies have found that this tendency is 
even stronger in pairs of non-democracies than in pairs of democracies.41
 
Therefore, the 
difficulty in obtaining assistance is likely to diminish as more authoritarian states develop 
nuclear capacities, as is arguably indicated by North Korea’s co-operation with Iranian 
scientists.42
 
For the time being, however, non-democracies face greater difficulty 
obtaining the building blocks of a nuclear-weapons programme due to their status in the 
international community. 
 
Nor is it only the nature of inter-state relations that damages the prospects for proliferation 
in authoritarian countries. The desire of these regimes to isolate domestic constituencies 
from transnational networks is an important factor in explaining the ineffectiveness of their 
nuclear-weapons programmes. International networks can be dangerous for authoritarian 
regimes. Exposure to them can spread democratic ideals, creates channels by which abuses 
are more readily communicated to external actors and provides avenues through which 
opposition groups can find support.43
 Moreover, they lead to a ‘blurring [of] the distinction 
between the international and the domestic’, which weakens the capacity of the state to 
control their societies.44
 
The logic of isolationism has been most dramatically borne out in 
North Korea, where the ability of the regime to limit interactions between its citizens and the 
outside world has been instrumental in ensuring regime stability.45
 
It is further illustrated by 
the widespread nature of Internet censorship in authoritarian countries, in which access is 
reserved for elites and unconstrained access for individuals is rare.46
  
 
This isolationism has important implications for the capability of these states to build 
nuclear weapons. Access to transnational scientific networks is indispensable for the 
effectiveness of research; as Yuri Ovchinnikov, vice president of the Soviet Academy of 
Sciences, argued in the 1970s, ‘contemporary science cannot be successfully developed if it 
is locked in the boundaries of one country’.47 Allowing scientists to participate in 
transnational networks provides access to the knowledge and skills needed to build nuclear 
weapons. Participation in academic exchanges is especially important in this regard; the 
training of young scientists in Europe and North America was critical to the success of 
programmes in South Africa, India and Pakistan, for example.48
 
If young Pakistani scientists 
had not been able to participate in academic exchanges, then Islamabad would ‘not have 
known what to do with the technology and materials it acquired from abroad’ and it ‘could 
not have obtained the requisite expertise solely through indigenous means’.49 Indeed, this is 
exactly the problem that plagued Libyan attempts to develop nuclear weapons.50 In most 
authoritarian countries state intervention seeks to control ‘incoming and outgoing … human 
resources, knowledge, ideas, research and equipment’.51 This interventionism leads to 
restrictions on a broad array of behaviours which ‘deprive’ scientists of the means to carry 
out projects effectively, including nuclear-weapons programmes.52
 
Moreover, by denying 
access to these networks, authoritarian regimes ‘blunt the motivating force of broad 
professional recognition’.53 Scientists’ motivation is thought to be a key determinant of the 
efficacy of nuclear programmes.54
 
Contrastingly, in democratic countries scientific 
communities are characterised by an almost unparalleled degree of global 
interconnectedness and transnational exchange. This ‘strengthens the scientific 
community’.55 By isolating scientists from international networks, authoritarian countries 
restrict the ability of scientists to construct the weapons which their leaders may seek. The 
future importance of this effect will be contingent on the continuing ability of authoritarian 
regimes to isolate themselves, as the spread of the Internet increases both the incentives to 
do so and the challenges involved.56 
 
Furthermore, the performance of the bureaucracy and the scientific community– and the 
relationship between the two – is central to determining the success of nuclear-weapons 
programmes.57
 
For the scientific community, performance is dependent on both a high 
degree of autonomy and a ‘spirit’ of co-operation with the state.58 Differing political 
structures give rise to an array of ‘deliberate and unintended mechanisms of social 
control’ which alter the relationship between the state and its scientists.59 In authoritarian 
countries this relationship ‘undermine[s] the performance of… nuclear scientists, 
engineers and technicians’.60 State-science relations are autocratic and scientists have little 
influence over ‘the formulation, distribution or choice of methods appropriate to the tasks 
undertaken’.61 Such a relationship undermines co-operation by creating tension between 
the state and scientists and confrontation can become ‘ritual’.62 Brazil, for example, is 
believed to have pursued nuclear weapons from the early 1950s until the 1990s, whilst the 
country was under the control of a military dictatorship.63 Here, the relationship between 
states and scientists deteriorated to the extent that open hostility existed between them.64 
Indeed, during this time, ‘political accountability replaced any vestige of scientific 
autonomy’.65 It is unsurprising, therefore, that its leadership expressed ‘frustration’ with 
the lack of progress in its nuclear programme.66 There is also danger inherent to policies 
that may help to repair the relationship between scientists and ruling elites by focusing on 
a common enemy, stoking nationalist sentiments and renewing commitment to the 
cause.67 As Argentina was increasingly identified as a major threat to Brazil’s national 
security, progress in the Brazilian nuclear programme accelerated.68 Thankfully, the 
democratisation of both countries during the 1980s contributed to a reduction in the 
perception of threat, which led in turn to the curtailment of nuclear ambitions.69 However, 
it is notable that in a deteriorating security environment, democratic Brazil is today 
believed to be interested once again in a nuclear arsenal.70  
 
Perhaps the most obvious challenge to the idea that authoritarian states are uniquely 
ineffective at producing nuclear weapons is the Soviet Union, which became the second 
country to obtain them and went on to create the largest known nuclear explosion. 
Interestingly, however, Soviet scientists enjoyed a ‘privileged relationship with the state’ 
and ‘possessed unique sources of autonomy’ compared to others in Soviet society.71 
Scientists were responsible for electing their own leadership and were given flexibility in 
responding to state directives.72 This was particularly true for physicists, many of whom 
worked in nuclear science. Indeed, the physics community was singled out as an area in 
which the Communist party was ‘exerting insufficient influence on the deployment of 
personnel … [and] the conduct of research’.73 Tellingly, efforts to increase the influence 
of the state in 1971 led to ‘conflict, duplication and confusion’ in scientific projects.74 
These characteristics are common consequences of the relationship between authoritarian 
governments and scientists,75 often proving devastating to the state’s  ability to produce 
nuclear weapons.  
 
Both the scientific community and bureaucracy in authoritarian states are likely to be 
highly politicised, undermining their effective operation. Among scientists, the additional 
burden of undertaking political activities detracts from the resources available for 
scientific projects.76
 
Furthermore, it often results in the promotion of less competent 
scientists to leadership positions and the underachievement of more able scientists, as 
ability ceases to be the main criterion for progression.77
 
The use of political criteria to 
determine appointments is not unusual in authoritarian states. Indeed, clientelism provides 
illegitimate regimes with a means of rewarding supporters and suborning potential 
opponents.78
 
The practice leads to inefficiency and ineptitude, posing an almost 
insurmountable challenge to the objective of creating efficient and effective weapons 
programmes, due to their inherent requirement for highly skilled specialists.79
 
Iraq is a 
good example in this regard; in the 1980s, Hussein Kamel Al-Majid, the half-brother of 
the country’s dictator Saddam Hussein, was given control of Iraq’s nuclear-weapons 
programme. His leadership ‘ravaged’ its progress, as a lack of technical knowledge led 
him to impose unrealistic deadlines which demotivated scientists.80 His management style 
also undermined co-operation, leading to mistrust between scientists working on the same 
project and to the duplication of work.81
  
 
It is unrealistic, however, to suggest that all authoritarian states are similar in this regard. 
In particular, development-focused regimes are characterised by an ‘unusual degree of 
bureaucratic autonomy’ and normally retain meritocratic recruitment practices.82 South 
Korea was ruled by military dictatorship for over thirty years until its transition to 
democracy in the early 1990s. Despite exercising extensive control over the country, the 
regime emphasised the importance of maintaining meritocratic recruitment practices and 
took measures to ensure that recruitment and progression in the public sector were 
dependent on performance.83  The country’s nuclear programme was also relatively 
successful. In 1975, the US Embassy in Seoul warned the State Department that it had 
underestimated South Korea’s ability to produce nuclear weapons and it could feasibly 
possess an arsenal within a decade.84 Indeed, it appears the country had overcome many of 
the technical hurdles to producing nuclear weapons by the late 1970s, including the 
production of substantial quantities of fissile material.85 Although the South Korean 
regime abandoned its nuclear programme following intense opposition from the US, 
today, it remains one of the states most capable of producing nuclear weapons within a 
short timeframe.86
 
Similarly, despite oscillating between outright military rule and quasi-
democratic government during the period of its nuclear development, Pakistan maintained 
a meritocratic structure within its bureaucracy and, has proven to be one of the only states 
to successfully build nuclear weapons whilst under authoritarian rule.87 In general, 
however, the pursuit of regime survival in the absence of democratic legitimacy means 
that authoritarian regimes are more likely to rely on patronage and clientelism to maintain 
political stability, undermining the degree to which recruitment and promotion to public 
positions is a meritocratic process.88 The degree to which they do so appears to be a good 
indicator of their ability to produce nuclear weapons. 
 
Thus, a number of factors make it likely that nuclear-weapons programmes in 
authoritarian countries will be ineffective. Such states are less likely to elicit co-operation 
from democratic states which, by and large, are those with the capacity and expertise 
needed to create a nuclear arsenal. Furthermore, the tendency of authoritarian states to 
isolate and control scientists undermines the ability of this community to carry out its 
work effectively. Finally, the politicisation of appointments in the bureaucratic and 
scientific communities leads to mismanagement and incompetence. These factors do not 
make it impossible for authoritarian countries to produce nuclear weapons; they do, 
however, make it considerably slower and more difficult. While North Korea has 
demonstrated that such challenges can be overcome, doing so takes time, and 
understanding this should provide policy-makers with broader time horizons in which to 
consider their decisions.  
 
Moreover, highlighting the obstacles authoritarian regimes face in developing successful 
nuclear programmes draws attention to points of weakness which policy-makers can 
leverage to limit the chance of proliferation. This ought also to prompt a reprioritisation 
of proliferation concerns. While at the time of writing few democracies are known to be 
pursuing the acquisition of nuclear weapons, this situation is unlikely to continue in 
perpetuity. From Eastern Europe to East Asia, democratic states face deteriorating 
security situations and growing unease about the reliability of security guarantees from 
their allies – usually embodied by the US. Given their relative capacity to quickly and 
effectively proliferate, greater attention should be afforded to the risks posed by these 
states and to the steps required to reduce the uncertainty and insecurity which create the 
incentive for them to seek nuclear weapons. Thankfully, as with any examination of 
nuclear proliferation, the conclusions drawn here are limited by the relatively few cases of 
states which have sought nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, failing to address this issue is 
‘potentially catastrophic’ and consequently, efforts to further the understanding of this 
important issue remain critically important.89 
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